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Abstract 
How might retirees consider deploying the retirement assets accumulated in a defined contribu-
tion pension plan? One possibility would be to purchase an immediate annuity. Another ap-
proach, called the “phased withdrawal” strategy in the literature, would have the retiree invest his 
funds and then withdraw some portion of the account annually. Using this second tactic, the 
withdrawal rate might be determined according to a fixed benefit level payable until the retiree 
dies or the funds run out, or it could be set using a variable formula, where the retiree withdraws 
funds according to a rule linked to life expectancy.  Using a range of data consistent with the 
German experience, we evaluate several alternative designs for phased withdrawal strategies, 
allowing for endogenous asset allocation patterns, and also allowing the worker to make deci-
sions both about when to retire and when to switch to an annuity. We show that one particular 
phased withdrawal rule is appealing since it offers relatively low expected shortfall risk, good 
expected payouts for the retiree during his life, and some bequest potential for the heirs. We also 
find that unisex mortality tables if used for annuity pricing can make women’s expected short-
falls higher, expected benefits higher, and bequests lower under a phased withdrawal program. 
Finally, we show that delayed annuitization can be appealing since it provides higher expected 
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1. Introduction 
In retirement, many people face the question of how to draw down assets that they have 
accumulated over their worklives. Economists often suggest that a sensible approach is to pur-
chase a life annuity. An annuity is a financial contract between an insured person and an insur-
ance company “that pays out a periodic amount for as long as the annuitant is alive, in exchange 
for an initial premium” (Brown et al., 2001: p. 1). The payments may be fixed in nominal terms 
(fixed annuity), or they might rise at a pre-specified fixed nominal escalation rate (graded annu-
ity), or they could be indexed to inflation (real annuity) keeping the retiree’s standard of living 
constant. Alternatively, they might reflect the return of a specific asset portfolio which backs the 
(variable) annuity, or they can depend on the insurance company’s experience with mortality, 
investment returns, and expenses (participating annuity). As Mitchell et al. (1999) note, the es-
sential attraction of a life annuity is that the individual is protected against the risk of outliving 
his own assets, given uncertainty about his remaining lifetime, by pooling longevity risk across a 
group of annuity purchasers. Yaari (1965) shows that risk-averse retirees without a bequest mo-
tive facing annuity markets that charge actuarially fair premiums, should annuitize 100 percent 
of their wealth. 
Though life annuities provide invaluable longevity insurance that cannot be replicated by 
pure investment vehicles, they also have some disadvantages. First, the purchaser faces loss of 
liquidity and control over his assets, because the lump sum premium cannot be recovered after 
purchase of the annuity, irrespective of special needs (e.g. to cover unexpected expenditures for 
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uninsured medical costs).i Second, in its simplest form, where income payments are contingent 
on the individual’ s survival, there is no chance of leaving money for heirs, even in the case of 
the annuitant’s early death. Other explanations for why individuals will be reluctant to buy an-
nuities are the high administrative costs levied by insurance companies (Mitchell et al., 1999), 
the ability to pool longevity risk within families (Brown and Poterba, 2000; Kotlikoff and 
Spivak, 1981), and the presence of other annuitized resources from Social Security or employer-
sponsored defined benefits plans (Munnell et al., 2002).  
Recent developments in European pension systems have focused attention on alternative 
income withdrawal patterns for asset pools dedicated to old-age consumption. In Germany, so-
called “Riester plans” offer tax inducements for voluntary saving in individual pension accounts 
(IPA) during the worklife, underscoring the government’s interest in boosting asset accumulation 
in an aging population (Börsch-Supan et al., 2003a, b). When the age of retirement is reached, 
twenty percent of the accumulated assets in the IPA can be taken as a lump-sum distribution. The 
rest must be drawn down in the form of a lifelong annuity (offered by a commercial insurance 
company) or a phased withdrawal plan (typically offered by mutual fund and/or bank providers) 
which must partly revert into an annuity at the age of 85. In the UK, personal pensions have also 
grown in popularity (Blake et al., 2003). As in Germany, a portion of the accumulated asset can 
be taken as a lump sum, while with the rest, one is legally obliged to buy an annuity by the age 
of 75. In Canada, at age 69 retirees must either buy an annuity with their tax-sheltered savings or 
create a discretionary managed withdrawal plan (Milevsky and Robinson, 2000). In the US, no 
compulsory annuitization is required for 401(k) plans at retirement; instead, many workers roll 
over their funds as a lump sum into an Individual Retirement Account which manage themselves 
in old age. Though some researchers have explored aspects of the accumulation phase in these 
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accounts (e.g. Maurer and Schlag, 2003; Blake et al., 2001), thus far, relatively little attention has 
been devoted to the payout phase.  
A key aspect of the retiree’s decumulation process is the decision of how to invest these 
retirement plan assets and how to structure payouts during the retirement period, so as to best 
balance consumption flows versus bequest intentions without running out of money. An alterna-
tive strategy to buying a life annuity is associated with what has been called “self-annuitization” 
or phased withdrawal approach (c.f. Milevsky and Robinson, 2000). At retirement, the wealth 
endowment is allocated across various asset categories (e.g. equity, bonds, cash) typically in-
cluded in a family of mutual funds where the assets will earn uncertain rates of return. A certain 
amount of the invested funds can then be withdrawn periodically for consumption purposes. The 
particular advantage of such a phased withdrawal strategy, as compared to the life annuity, is that 
it offers greater liquidity, the possibility of greater consumption while alive as well as the possi-
bility of bequeathing some of the assets in the event of early death. On the other hand, relying on 
income flows withdrawn directly from an IRA without any insurance provides no pooling of 
longevity risk. Consequently, if the retiree constantly consumes an equal amount from his ac-
count, he could outlive his assets before his uncertain date of death, particularly in the event of 
long-run low investment returns. An alternative withdrawal rule is to not take out some fixed 
amount per period, but rather to consume a specified fraction of the remaining fund wealth each 
period. This second strategy, in contrast to the fixed withdrawal technique, avoids the risk of 
outliving one’s total assets, as long as the benefit-to-wealth ratio is lower than one. Nevertheless, 
due to stochastic investment returns, the value of the pension accounts assets change over time 
implying that the periodically withdrawn amount must vary in tandem – and it could be substan-
tially lower or higher than the benefit payable under a life annuity. 
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To be able to evaluate the different decumulation options on a quantitative basis, it is 
necessary to introduce a formal risk/return framework for decision-making under uncertainty. 
The standard approach in financial economics is to maximize the expected discounted value of a 
(time separable) utility function for uncertain future benefits and (if necessary) for a bequest. For 
example, Blake et al. (2003) use a utility function of the constant relative risk class (CRRA), to 
evaluate different withdrawals plans assuming mandatory annuitization is required at age 75. 
Milevsky and Young (2003) use a similar objective function to determine the value of the option 
to defer annuitization. A shortcoming of such an approach, especially in the practical world, is 
that the decision-maker rarely has explicit measures of risk preferences without knowing the 
shape of his utility function. As Pye 2000 pointed out, “neither endowment fund managers nor 
financial planners are using these models to help make decisions”. As a result, risk-value (or 
risk-return) models of choice have the advantage of developing an explicit measure of risk, an 
explicit measure of value, and a function reflecting the trade-offs between value and risk. 
Clearly, individuals prefer more return to less and less risk to more, other things equal. This 
property allows a partial-ordering of opportunities within a risk-return dominance context, even 
if the exact preference weights for the risk and return tradeoff are unknown. Depending on which 
risk metric is selected and how the trade-off between risk and return is formulated, a risk-value 
model can but need not be consistent with the expected utility approach of choice (Sarin and 
Weber 1993).ii 
In this paper, we take a risk-value approach, whereby the “return” is the expected level of 
benefits as well as the expected possibility of bequest, and the “risk” is the possibility of not 
reaching a benchmark or desired level of consumption. Previous studies taking this tack focus on 
the probability of consumption shortfall as the operative risk measure.iii Assuming that the retiree 
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consumes a fixed real amount at specific points in time from a self-managed pension account, 
these authors calculate the probability of running out of money before the uncertain date of death 
using alternative assumption about the asset allocation, the initial consumption-to-wealth ratio, 
and the optimal waiting time before switching the retirement wealth into an annuity. Our work 
extends this literature in several directions. First, we examine the risk and return profiles of sev-
eral variable self-annuitization strategies that provide payments according to predetermined 
benefit-to-wealth ratio. Second, we address a major shortcoming of the shortfall-probability risk 
measure, namely that it ignores the size of the possible loss that may be experienced. In practice, 
of course, both theoretical and empirical arguments suggest that investors take both the probabil-
ity and the amount of a possible shortfall into consideration. Our contribution is to go beyond 
prior work by looking not only at the probability of a consumption shortfall, but also consider 
the size of the shortfall when it occurs. Third, we examine how the results change if a mandatory 
annuitization rule were imposed akin to those in the recent German and UK pension regulation. 
Fourth, we evaluate the impact of allowing the annuitization date to be endogenous, along with 
the asset allocation decision. We illustrate how the risk of a consumption shortfall and return 
profiles of fixed and variable phased withdrawal strategies compare to the life annuity, and indi-
cate what dominant strategies might be. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. The next section describes sev-
eral different withdrawal strategies. To illustrate their implications, we assume conditions with 
respect to capital and insurance markets products and pricing found in the German annuity and 
capital marketplace. We adopt these so as to be informative about alternative payout options that 
might be contemplated under the German Riester plans when they reach maturity. Most results 
focus on an age-65 male retiree, but we also provide findings for other ages and for women. Sec-
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tion three reports results using a fixed asset allocation pattern, and Section four permits assets to 
be allocated optimally. A final section summarizes and concludes. 
2. The Case of Phased Withdrawal 
2.1 Withdrawal Plans with Fixed Benefits 
We assume that the retiree is endowed with an initial wealth of V0 that he can use to buy 
a single-premium immediate life annuity paying constant annual real benefits B at the beginning 
of each year, for life with no bequest. We denote this as the benchmark annuity and refer the 
reader to Appendix A regarding the pricing of such an insurance product using assumption about 
mortality, loadings and interest rates to discount future annuity payments. If the retiree does not 
annuitize his wealth, he invests the retirement assets in various financial assets (e.g. equities, 
bonds, cash) typically represented by a family of mutual funds, and then he withdraws a certain 
amount at the beginning of the year for consumption purposes. Throughout the paper, we assume 
that benefits are taxed as ordinary income; therefore taxes will not change the desirability of vol-
untary annuitization or systematic withdrawal from a self-managed retirement account.iv 
Under the fixed benefit rule, the retiree will sell at the beginning of each year as many 
fund units as required to reach the same yearly benefits paid by the life annuity, until either he 
dies, or the retirement assets are exhausted. Formally, the benefits Bt at the beginning of each 
year are given by: 
 ),min( tt VBB = ,  (1) 
where Vt is the value of the retirement accounts assets wealth at the beginning of year t (t = 0, 1, 
…) just before the withdrawal Bt for that year is made. The retiree faces an intertemporal budget 
constraint that wealth next period Vt+1 equals wealth today Vt, less what is subtracted for benefit 
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payments Bt, times the (inflation adjusted) portfolio return Rt+1 over the period, or zero if the 
fund is exhausted: 
 .
.0
)1)((
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ttt
tttt  (2) 
Note that the benefit paid Bt depends on the value Vt of the retirement assets used to fi-
nance withdrawals. If these assets are risky, the benefit payouts are exposed to uncertain capital 
market returns. The idea of the fixed benefit rule is to replicate the income from a life annuity as 
long as the funds permit, while at the same time offering some bequest potential in the event of 
an early death. Nevertheless, the risk of the fixed benefit rule is that adverse capital markets 
linked to longevity outcomes might produce a situation where Vt hits zero and therefore Bt = Bt+1 
= … = 0, while the retiree is still alive. 
2.2. Phased Withdrawal Rules with Variable Benefits 
Under a variable phased withdrawal plan, the retiree receives not a fixed benefit amount 
per period, but rather an ex ante fixed fraction of the retirement assets remaining each period. 
This benefit-wealth ratio can be constant, increasing, or decreasing over time. Due to the sto-
chastic nature of capital markets, the value of the retiree’s fund is exposed to positive as well as 
negative fluctuations. Consequently, the level of benefit payments under a variable withdrawal 
plan also fluctuates in tandem with the accounts value. Depending on the withdrawal fraction 
and the realized returns of the retirement accounts assets, benefit payments could be substantially 
lower – or higher – than payments from a life annuity at some point during the post retirement 
phase. A variable phased withdrawal plan and a variable annuity have in common the fact that 
they pay pension benefits that vary with uncertain investment returns. Nevertheless, the former 
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offers the possibility of bequeathing the remaining value of the retirement account in the case of 
the retiree’s death, while the latter does not.  
The path of benefits payable using a variable phased withdrawal rule can be formalized 
as follows. Let Vt be the value of the retirement assets at the beginning of period t (t = 0, 1, …) 
before the withdrawal Bt for that year is made. At the beginning of every period t, an ex ante 
specified fraction ωt  (0 < ωt ≤ 1) is withdrawn from current wealth; hence the retiree receives a 
payment according to: 
 ttt VB ⋅= ω  (3) 
Further let Rt+1 denote the return of the funds over the period. Then, the intertemporal 
budget constraint of the retirement account is given by: 
 )1()1()1()( 111 +++ +⋅⋅−=+⋅−= ttttttt RVRBVV ω . (4) 
If the retiree dies at the beginning of period t+1, Vt+1 represents the bequest potential for 
his heirs. Note that if the assets of the pension account are invested in risky assets (e.g. stocks 
and/or bonds), the returns are also uncertain, and therefore both the pension benefits Bt as well as 
the bequest potential Vt are random variables.  
In what follows, we focus attention on three specific withdrawal rules that generate vari-
able benefits: the fixed percentage rule, the 1/T rule, and the 1/E(T) rule. Each is discussed in 
turn. 
 “Fixed Percentage” Withdrawal Rule: Here a constant fraction is withdrawn each period from 
the remaining fund wealth, i.e. the benefit-wealth ratio is fixed over time: 
 .ωω == t
t
t
V
B
 (5) 
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This withdrawal rule has the advantage of simplicity, requiring no information regarding the 
maximum possible duration of the payout phase or the retiree’s characteristics (i.e. age, sex).  
"1/T Rule" Withdrawal Rule: The idea behind this rule is to set the withdrawal fraction ac-
cording to the maximum possible duration of the plan, denoted by T. One way is to set T equal to 
the oldest age assumed in a mortality table; another is to fix it at the retiree’s life expectancy as 
of his retirement date (Brown et al., 1999). In the first case, the maximum number of payments T 
is given by the limiting age l of the mortality table minus the current age of the retiree x plus one:  
 1+−= xlT . (6) 
The retiree gets a fraction of 1/T of his initial pension account as the first payment, the second 
payment is worth 1/(T –1) of the remaining assets, and so forth until the retiree either passes 
away or reaches the plan’s limiting age l. Formally, the benefit-wealth ratio at the beginning of 
year t (t = 0, 1, …T-1) of this retirement plan is given according to: 
 .1
tTV
B
t
t
t
−== ω  (7) 
In contrast to the fixed percentage rule discussed above, the withdrawal fraction is not constant 
but rather increases with age. What this means is that the longer the retiree survives, the higher 
the withdrawal fraction will be. For example, if l = 110 and x = 65 the first withdrawal fraction at 
age 65 is ω0 = 1/46 = 2.17%, the second at age 66 is ω1 = 1/45 =  2.22%, and at age 101 the bene-
fit to wealth ratio is ω101 = 10%. The rule pay out all of the remaining wealth of the retirement 
account (i.e. ω110 = 100%) by the age of 110 – no bequest potential is left – in contrast to the 
fixed percentage rule. 
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“1/E[T(x)]" Withdrawal Rule: This rule, which we will call the 1/E(T) rule for short, takes into 
consideration the retiree’s remaining life expectancy in a dynamic way. Now the withdrawal 
fraction is no longer determined by the maximum length of the plan, but instead by the retiree’s 
life expectancy remaining. Let t px represents the conditional probability that an x-year old man 
will attain age x + t, the complete expectation of life is calculated as:  
 [ ] ∑−
=
=+
xl
t
xt ptxT
0
)(E  (8) 
where l is the maximum age according to a mortality table. Then, for an at retirement x-year old 
man, the benefit-to-wealth ratio in period t after retirement, conditional on the fact that he is still 
alive, is given as: 
 .
)](E[
1
txTV
B
t
t
t
+== ω  (9) 
The shorter his expected remaining lifetime, the higher the fraction he will withdrawal from his 
pension account. Therefore, the withdrawal fraction rises with the age of the retiree. Since the 
retiree’s life expectancy is less than the maximum age of the mortality tables, the benefit-to-
wealth ratio of the 1/E(T) rule exceeds that of the 1/T rule, in general. The 1/E(T) withdrawal 
rule is used in the US during the decumulation phase of 401(k) plans, where the tax authority 
seeks to ensure that retirees consume their tax-qualified pension accounts instead of leaving them 
as bequests for their heirs (see Munnell et al., 2002). 
3. Risk and Reward Analysis of Phased Withdrawal Plans Conditional on Survival 
3.1 Research Design 
To compare the risk and value characteristics of the four phased withdrawal rules, it is 
useful to begin with an assessment of expected payouts conditional on retiree survival (Section 4 
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generalizes results with mortality-weighted risk and reward computations). For the moment, the-
refore, we focus only on the risk resulting from capital markets and suppress mortality. To do so, 
we assume a 65-year old male retiree who seeks to compare benefits under the four phased with-
drawal plans given an initial asset balance. The plan assets are rebalanced annually to maintain 
an asset pool split evenly between stocks and bonds, consistent with recommendations by finan-
cial advisors (asset allocation is optimized in the next section).v We employ an annuitant mortal-
ity table provided by the German Society of Actuaries to calculate survival probabilities and ex-
pected lifetime (in the 1/E(T) case). Since this table ends at age 110, we set l = 110 for the 1/T 
rule. For the fixed percentage withdrawal rule, we select ω = 5.82%, since this benefit-to-wealth 
ratio produces an initial payout equal to the life annuity in the first year of the plan. In the case of 
the fixed benefit rule, we assume that the initial withdrawal continues until the retiree dies or the 
account is exhausted.  
We next assess the risk and return patterns that emerge under these alternative phased 
withdrawal patterns (before taxes), compared to a fixed real annuity providing lifelong constant 
payouts. When focusing on risks and benefits, the computations either assume that the retiree is 
alive, or conversely we evaluate the bequest potential if the retiree is assumed to pass away at a 
specific age. To do so, we specify an exogenous structure on the ex-ante probability distribution 
governing the financial uncertainty of future returns and estimate the parameters of such a model 
from independent (e.g. yearly) historical observations of real returns. With such a model in place, 
it is possible to look into the future and compute the expected benefit payments and different 
shortfall-risk measures of the four withdrawal plans in which we are interested. Implementing it 
relies on the assumption that the stochastic specification of the asset values in the retirement ac-
count follows Geometric Brownian motion, a standard assumption in financial economics (which 
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can be traced back to Bachellier, 1900). This implies that the yearly log-returns are i.i.d. and 
normally distributed. We also use German historical time series over the period 1967-2002 for 
the German Equity Index (DAX) and the German Bond Index (REXP) as proxies for stock and 
bond investments. The DAX represents an index portfolio of German blue-chip stocks, and the 
REXP represents a portfolio of German government bonds. Each of these indices is adjusted for 
capital gains as well as dividends and coupon payments (on a pre-tax basis). To account for po-
tential administrative costs, we subtract the equivalent of 0.5% p.a. from the yearly portfolio re-
turn.vi Subsequently, asset returns are adjusted for inflation by using the German Consumer Price 
Index.  
These yearly data produce estimates (before taxes) for the real log average rate of return, 
the volatility and the correlation-coefficients of stocks and bonds as reported in Appendix C: 
Since we assume normally distributed log returns, i.e. It = ln(1 + Rt) ~ N(µ, σ ), these parameters 
imply a real log average rate of return on the fifty-fifty stock-bond portfolio of µ = 5.52 percent 
with a standard deviation of σ = 13.78 %. Note that this produces an expected gross rate of return 
of E(1 + Rt) = E[exp(It)] = exp[0.0552 + 0.5*0.1378²] = 1.066.  
Assuming that the normality property also holds for the log portfolio returns,vii it is 
straightforward to develop an analytical closed form solution for the probability distribution of 
future benefits of the different variable phased withdrawal rules since the intertemporal budget 
constraint given in equation (4) is (log)linear (see Appendix B for details). However, because the 
value of the retirement accounts value might hit zero, the intertemporal budget constraint in 
equation (2) for the fixed benefit rule is not (log)linear, and future benefits are path-dependent. 
Hence, even under the assumption of independent and identically distributed log portfolio re-
turns, for the fixed benefits withdrawal plan the probability distribution of future benefits is un-
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known. Therefore, to obtain estimates for the different risk and return measure we use Monte-
Carlo simulation to generate a large number (i.e. 100,000) of paths for the evolution of the with-
drawal plan.viii 
3.2 Analysis of Expected Benefits 
Figure 1 depicts the Expected Benefits profiles conditional on survival, for the four 
phased withdrawal rules, as compared to the annuity profile. Focusing on the fixed benefit rule 
shows that in the first year, mean benefits are (by construction) equal to the annuity benefit. 
However, in the following years, the expected payments from the plan are decreasing, reflecting 
the risk of running out of money. The fixed fraction rule also starts with a benefit equal to the life 
annuity payout, and after that, mean benefits slightly rise as the retiree ages. This is due to the 
fact that the pension account’s expected gross rate of return is 6.66% p.a., which exceeds the 
constant benefit-to-wealth-ratio of 5.82% p.a. (i.e. 1.066*(1-0.0582) = 1.004 > 1).    
Figure 1 here 
By contrast, the 1/T rule pays a much lower expected benefit up to the age of 80, but 
thereafter, the expected benefit rises extremely quickly and to very high levels, reaching almost 
700% of the annuity payment late in life. This can be explained by the low withdrawal fractions 
of this rule during the first part of the retirement plan. Up to age 95, the benefit-to-wealth ratio is 
lower than the expected rate of return (i.e. 6.66%); consequently, the expected value of the pen-
sion assets grows over time. “Reserves” built up in earlier ages can be used to increase the ex-
pected benefits in later years. The 1/E(T) rule starts at a level of about 85% of the annuity pay-
ment and increases to 100% if the retiree reaches age 70. This payout approach reaches its 
maximum expected payment of about 150% at age of 83. After this age, the expected payments 
are monotonously decreasing, reaching the level of the life annuity at age 91. At ages older than 
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100, following the 1/E(T) rule would leave the retiree very exposed to quite low benefits, asymp-
totically approaching 0. Note that the withdrawal fraction under the 1/E(T) rule is higher than 
under the 1/T rule. Only for the first six years of the retirement plan will the benefit-to-wealth 
ratio be lower than the expected return earned on pension assets. If the retiree survives until age 
71, his expected lifetime is about 15 years, resulting in a withdrawal fraction of 6.66% which is 
about the same as the expected rate of return. Beyond that age, the withdrawal fraction grows 
ever larger than the expected asset returns backing benefit payments. For some time (i.e. up to 
age 83), the increasing withdrawal fractions produce increasing expected benefits. But because 
less and less wealth is left in the fund, at some point (here age 83) the expected benefit amounts 
decrease although the withdrawal fraction increases. 
3.3. Shortfall Risk Analysis 
3.3.1 Shortfall Probability 
In accordance with other fields of research, as well as with conventional wisdom, short-
fall risk is associated with the possibility of “something bad happening”, in other words, falling 
below a required target return. Returns below the target (losses) are considered to be undesirable 
or risky, while returns above the target (gains) are desirable or non-risky. In this sense, shortfall-
risk-measures are called “relative” or “pure” measures of risk.ix  To analyze this risk in the case 
of our phased withdrawal strategies, we employ several different shortfall risk measures. We 
begin with the shortfall probability, defined as: 
 SP(Bt) = P(Bt < z). (10) 
This measures the probability that the periodic withdrawal Bt is smaller than a chosen benchmark 
z, which is here the payment provided by the life annuity. 
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Figure 2 depicts the Shortfall Probability for the fixed benefit rule, the fixed fraction rule 
(5.82%), the 1/T approach and the 1/E(T) rule, as compared to the annuity benefit. In the first 
year, all the strategies except the fixed benefit program face a high probability of shortfall, and 
the only reason the fixed benefit approach does not is that it is set by construction to pay the ini-
tial annuity value as long as the funds have not been exhausted. The fixed benefit program offers 
a Shortfall Probability close to zero at the beginning of the retirement period, but this risk metric  
begins to rise over time, reaching about 20% around age 85. By contrast, both the 1/T and 1/E(T) 
rules have very high shortfall probabilities early in the retirement period. This is because a retiree 
investing his assets in a mutual fund hoping to generate the same payment offered by the life 
annuity must withdraw about 6.50% of the fund annually. But the withdrawal fractions under the 
1/T and the 1/E(T) rules are smaller early in retirement, meaning that the wealth remaining 
grows quickly. Consequently the shortfall probability declines over time, though the withdrawal 
fraction is growing. The retiree that withdraws a fixed fraction each year faces a risk profile that 
is remarkably high for all ages. In early years, the probability of receiving a benefit below the 
benchmark life annuity is about 50%, gradually increasing to about 60% at the end of the pe-
riod.x    
Figure 2 here 
Another interesting finding has to do with the gradient of the Shortfall Probability under 
the 1/E(T) rule. Early in the retirement period there is a very fast decline in this risk, but if the 
retiree is still alive at age 83, the SP begins to rise very quickly due to the special construction of 
this spending rule. In contrast to the 1/T rule, expected payments at the beginning of the plan are 
already higher, meaning that few “reserves” are built up in the beginning of the plan. Also, the 
65-year-old retiree has an expected remaining lifetime of 19 years, and his expected remaining 
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lifetime decreases over time, especially after the age of 80. The shorter is the remaining expected 
lifetime, the more wealth will be withdrawn in the 1/E(T) case. As the withdrawal fractions in-
crease, less and less wealth is left in the fund; at some point, wealth remaining is insufficient to 
provide high enough payments, so the shortfall probability again increases.  
3.3.2 Shortfall Measures That Incorporate Severity  
As Bodie (2001: 308) notes, a major shortcoming of the popular SP risk metric is that it 
“completely ignores how large the potential shortfall might be.” The shortfall probability an-
swers the question “how often” consumption falls short, but not “how bad” the loss is if it oc-
curs, under each of the different withdrawal rules. To provide information about the potential 
extent of a shortfall, we next calculate the Mean Excess Loss (MEL) as an additional risk meas-
ure. Formally this risk metric is given by: 
 MEL(Bt)=E[ z – Bt | Bt < z ]. (11) 
It indicates the expected loss with respect to the benchmark, under the condition that a shortfall 
occurs. Therefore, given a loss, the MEL answers the question “how badly on average” does the 
strategy perform; it MEL can be characterized as a ‘worst case’ risk measure, which is highly 
sensitive with respect to realisations at the tail of the distribution (i.e. large-scale shortfalls). xi 
An additional shortfall risk measure that links both the probability and the extent of the 
conditional shortfall in an intuitive way is the Shortfall Expectation (SE): 
 SE(Bt) = E[max(z - Bt,0)] = MEL(Bt)ּSP(Bt). (12) 
The shortfall expectation is the sum of losses weighted by their probabilities, and hence it is a 
measure of the unconditional “average loss”. As equation (12) shows, the SE is simply the prod-
uct of the shortfall probability and the mean level of shortfall given the occurrence of a short-
fall.xii 
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In Figure 3 we plot the Mean Excess Loss results for the various withdrawal strategies of 
interest, namely the fixed benefit rule, the fixed fraction rule (5.82%), the 1/T approach and the 
1/E(T) rule. Here we compare the MEL for each tactic versus the annuity benefit.  Results are 
similar in form: that is, in the first year, all strategies but the fixed benefit program have a posi-
tive MEL, since the fixed benefit approach pays for as long as possible an amount equal to the 
initial annuity. The 1/T rule has a particularly high initial MEL, at 60% of the value of the annu-
ity payment, and this falls only to 30% some 15 years into the retirement period. Both the 1/E(T) 
and the fixed fraction rules have 30% MEL profiles through about age 90, but then the 1/E(T) 
rule confronts the retiree with a rapidly rising mean excess loss attaining close to 100% late in 
life. By contrast, the 1/T plan faces the retiree with a gradually declining expected loss after age 
90, falling to about 30%. The results make clear that from a worst-case risk perspective, the fixed 
fraction rule, and the 1/E(T) rule, are not proper financial instruments for insurance against lon-
gevity.  
Figure 3 here 
The profiles for the Shortfall Expectation appear in Figure 4, and it will be recalled that 
these combine the Shortfall Probability and the Mean Excess Loss, all conditional on survival. 
This graph underscores the patterns revealed by the two previously analyzed risk measures. Now 
the fixed benefit rule has a very low Shortfall Expectation through about age 83, whereas the 1/T 
rule is initially the riskiest with a 60% SE. It takes a very long time until the SE of the 1/T rule 
declines to a negligible level – older than age 90 for the hypothetical individual under study. The 
fixed fraction and the 1/E(T) rules have a SE of less than 20% through at least age 80, but the 
1/E(T) rule again traces out what is perhaps unexpected behavior – after falling to low levels 
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through about age 84, the risk begins to rise substantially 20 years after retirement, and it has the 
highest expected shortfall for the long-lived individual.  
Figure 4 here 
3.4. Analysis of Expected Bequests 
The other side of the story behind these rules is that the retiree must in effect compare his 
own consumption with the potential value of the bequest that would go to the heirs if he should 
die. Figure 5 illustrates the expected bequest under the various formulations, conditional on 
death. The pattern exhibiting most stability is the fixed fraction rule, but the other three are 
highly divergent. For example, the 1/T rule shows an interesting path, first rising in the early 
retirement period when withdrawals are small. About 35 years after retirement, however, the 
expected bequest begins to decline very quickly – a fact that is directly attributable to the con-
struction of this plan. The older a retiree gets, the more he or she withdraws from his account: 
thus five years before the plan ends, the retiree withdraws 1/5=20% of the remaining wealth. If 
the retiree should by chance live beyond age 110, this approach offers no continued payment or 
bequest potential. The 1/E(T) rule also offers only a very low bequest potential after reaching a 
limiting age. In contrast with the 1/T rule, however, the 1/E(T) plan offers lower expected inheri-
tance at every age. Particularly if the retiree does not die until 20 years into retirement, the in-
heritance will decline dramatically.  
Figure 5 here 
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4. Risk-Minimizing Phased Withdrawal Strategies 
4.1. Optimized Withdrawal Rules in a Risk-Return Context  
Thus far, our analysis has assumed that the retiree holds his pension plan assets in a 
fixed-weight portfolio comprised of 50% stocks and 50% bonds over a fixed investment horizon. 
Thus the payouts during retirement take into account only capital market uncertainty, and there 
was no possibility of optimization around risk/reward tradeoffs. In this section, we extend the 
analysis by including a consideration of mortality risk, and further we discuss two additional 
phased withdrawal rules that permit the retiree to optimize the design of the withdrawal patterns. 
In the next subsection, our analysis varies the investment weights of the associated with stock, 
bonds, and cash investments, to attain a “risk-minimizing” static asset allocation. The portfolio 
weights are therefore determined endogenously (excluding short-selling), following Albrecht and 
Maurer (2002). In the following subsection, we go on to examine the impact of mandatory shift-
ing to annuitization at a specific age. This is currently required in tax qualified German Riester 
plans at the age of 85 and for UK income drawdown plans at the age 75. In both countries, the 
restriction of mandatory switching has already considerable criticism in the public debate (c.f. 
Blake et al. 2003; Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2003b). 
To evaluate how the relative ranking of the alternative withdrawal rules might change 
with an endogenous asset mix in the retiree’s investment fund and other plan design parameters, 
it is useful to define the expected present value of the shortfall, called here “EPVShortfall”: 
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Here, SE(Bt) = E[max(z – Bt, 0)] denotes the expected shortfall with respect to the target z, which 
is equal to the benefit provided by the benchmark life annuity. The possible expected shortfall in 
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year t are weighted by the conditional probability tpx that a man aged x at the beginning of the 
retirement phase is still alive, in the case when a shortfall occurs. All possible expected shortfalls 
are discounted back to the beginning of the retirement period using the risk-free interest rate Rf 
(i.e. assuming a flat term structure of real interest rates) and summed over the maximum length 
of the mortality table used. This useful summary measure of the risk associated with a phased 
withdrawal strategy may be interpreted as the lump sum premium that would be required for the 
retiree to transfer this shortfall risk to an insurer, assuming actuarially fair pricing and no addi-
tional loading.xiii Given this function, we minimize it with regard to asset allocation and other 
plan design parameters, to derive the asset allocation patterns most amenable to alternative with-
drawal rules.   
Previous studies, most notably Milevsky (1998), Milevsky and Robinson (2000) and 
Albrecht and Maurer (2002), approach the issue of optimal fixed benefits withdrawal rules by 
adopting the criterion of controlling the probability of a consumption shortfall in retirement. On 
the other hand, as we have argued, this perspective does not account for the size of the loss when 
it happens, which our risk measure does. 
To extend the approach, we adopt two additional reward measures associated with each 
optimized phased withdrawal strategy, namely, the expected present value of benefits received 
during life (EPVBenefits) and the expected present value of bequests at death (EPVBequest). 
These are defined, respectively, as: 
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Here, the EPVBenefits is similar defined as the money worth concept used by Mitchell et al. 
(1999) and reflects the expected present value of benefit payments conditional on survival. Fi-
nally, EBVBequest measures the expected present value of the inheritance that the retiree would 
pass on to heirs, in the event of death. 
We implement these metrics instead of adopting a specific utility function for several rea-
sons. First, these risk measures are consistent with expected utility analysis, since they are the 
primitives that enter into utility maximizers’ objective functions.xiv Any particular functional 
form must embody specific tradeoffs between risk and return components, whereas our approach 
can remain agnostic about the specific weights attached to each (Sarin and Weber 1993). Second, 
risk minimization is consistent with many studies in the literature (c.f. Albrecht and Maurer, 
2002;  Chen and Milevsky, 2003; Milevsky and Robinson, 1994), and it is also consistent with 
conventional wisdom offered by money managers and financial planners when providing advice 
regarding retirement income payouts (c.f. Ameriks, forthcoming; Ameriks et al., 2001; Ibbotson 
Associates, 2003).  
The specific optimized rules we propose are two: a “Fixed Percent Optimized” rule, and a 
“1/T Optimized” rule. The first (Fixed Percent Optimized) rule minimizes the expected present 
value of the shortfall by selecting jointly the optimal constant withdrawal fraction and the re-
tiree’s asset allocation. This contrasts from our earlier constant withdrawal rule, by endogenizing 
the withdrawal fraction. Compared to the non-optimized Fixed Percent rule, we expect that al-
lowing two parameters, the fraction consumed as well as the asset allocation, will be more suc-
cessful in controlling both mortality and capital market risk. The second rule, denoted as “1/T 
Optimized” minimizes the EPVShortfall by selecting jointly the maximum duration of the plan 
conditional on survival, along with the asset allocation. We expect that the 1/T Optimized rule 
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will permit more consumption when the probability is high that the retiree remains alive, as 
compared to the non-optimized 1/T rule, but it will also offer lower expected bequests.  
4.2. Comparative Results: Annuity versus Phased Withdrawal Plans  
Table 1 reports results for the various withdrawal rules of interest here allowing opti-
mized asset allocation. These may be compared to results for the benchmark case of a life annu-
ity benefit which appear in Row 1: a 65-year old male who pays €100 for an immediate real an-
nuity will receive annual benefits of €5.82 for life (at the beginning of each year).  By construc-
tion, both the EPVShortfall and EPVBequest are zero for the annuity purchase; the EPVBenefits 
measure is slightly below €100 due to the annuity load assumed.  In Row 2 we report results for 
a phased withdrawal program where the Fixed Benefit is equal to the annuity at €5.82 as before; 
of course, the retiree may run short of funds since he is not actually annuitizing. The optimized 
asset allocation associated with minimizing the EPVShortfall for this Fixed Benefit withdrawal 
plan consists of 20% stocks and 80% bonds, and associated with this plan is an expected shortfall 
worth €3.58  per €100 of initial assets. As long as the retiree lives, he can expect benefits totaling 
€93.41 (in present value), or about 4.3% below the real annuity. Of course, on other hand, the 
bequest his heirs can expect is quite large, at €53.2 (or more than half the initial investment). 
Clearly, unless a retiree had an enormous taste for bequests, annuitization would be judged far 
superior to taking a fixed benefit at 5.82€ per annum until the fund is probably exhausted.  Rows 
3 and 4 of Table 1 displays results for two Fixed Percentage strategies. The first is determined by 
selecting a Fixed Percentage rule that pays out a first-year benefit equivalent to the €5.82 real 
lifelong annuity purchased by the 65-year old male paying €100. Given this constant benefit-
wealth-ration (i.e. ω = 5.82%) we solve for the optimal asset mix minimizing the EPVShortfall. 
Table 1 here 
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The second strategy selects a fixed fraction that is now also optimized with regard to 
EPVShortfall. What is different here is that both the asset allocation and the withdrawal fraction 
is simultaneously optimized at the beginning of the retirement phase. These two rows indicate is 
that, in both cases, the risk measured by the EPVShortfall is almost four times as large as under 
the Fixed Benefit approach. Offsetting this could be the higher benefit stream conditional on 
survival and higher bequest value to the heirs. Both Fixed Percentage strategies have slightly 
higher equity exposures (30%) than the Fixed Benefit approach (20%). This is in contrast to the 
high equity exposures recommended by Albrecht and Maurer (2002) and Vora and McGinnes 
(2000) using a fixed benefit withdrawal approach. Of course the optimized strategy that permits 
a fixed percentage payout of 7% of the account annually has a lower expected shortfall and 
higher expected benefits than the non-optimized strategy. 
Next we turn to the two 1/T rules, where again the first simply sets T to the maximum 
plan duration (the oldest age in the mortality table), and optimizing asset allocation with mini-
mizing EPVshortfall. The second endogenously evaluates both, the asset allocation and the plan 
duration that minimizes EPVShortfall.  It is interesting that the simple 1/T rule (Row 5) results in 
the highest equity exposure, and it is also unlikely to be preferred by many:  the size of the ex-
pected shortfall is the largest of those considered (€35 of the initial €100 asset), and the expected 
benefits are the lowest of those examined. The only clear gainers are likely to be the heirs. We 
contrast this with the pattern that would result from optimizing the maximum plan duration, 
which the retiree could do if he had Social Security or welfare to live on in the event that his as-
set is extinguished and he is still alive. This would occur around age 87, according to the pro-
gram computed. Row 6 indicates using the 1/T rule optimized for asset allocation and the date of 
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running out of assets offers lower risk, higher expected than the annuity, a reasonable bequest, 
and the asset allocation is not too risky (15% equity, 75% bonds, and 10% cash).   
Finally we examine Row 7 which refers to the 1/E(T) rule, which is consistent with the 
phased withdrawal scheme allowed by the US tax authority for 401(k) pension plans. This is an 
interesting strategy, because it offers quite low expected shortfalls, and 6% higher expected 
benefits as compared to the life annuity, while still affording a decent bequest potential. The as-
set allocation implied is rather conservative, with 20% in equity and 80% in bonds. Overall, 
looking across the phased withdrawal plans, there is no clearly dominant strategy, since all in-
volve tradeoffs between risk, benefit, and bequest measures, and individual preferences may 
vary. Nevertheless, the 1/E(T) rule seems relatively appealing as compared to the others, as long 
as the retiree has only a moderate appetite for bequests.  
The second panel of Table 1 reports results for a female age-65 retiree considering the 
same phased withdrawal patterns. To summarize results, we find that women confront lower 
expected shortfall risks in all cases and can anticipate higher EPVBenefits. This occurs because 
the lower female mortality translates into a lower initial annuity payment; i.e. her actuarially fair 
benefit is €5.02 per year for a €100 purchase (versus the male payout of €5.82). Consequently, 
variable withdrawal plans have the woman withdraw less early in life, leaving more assets in the 
fund to earn future capital market returns. Since the woman also is expected to live longer, she 
will more likely be alive to reap the fruits of the investment. We would therefore predict, and the 
results confirm, that the 1/E(T) rule is more attractive to women than men, since it offers rather 
low expected shortfalls, and 15% higher expected benefits as compared to the annuity, while still 
affording a decent bequest potential.  It is also interesting that the asset allocation strategies for 
women are similar to those for men but do have slightly lower equity exposure overall.  
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Thus far, the analysis has assumed the retiree begins the payout phase at age 65, but it 
may be of interest to explore how the phased withdrawal patterns behave with alternative retire-
ment ages. Table 2 displays the findings for a male retiring at age 60 or age 70, which can be 
directly compared with the top panel of Table 1.  What the results show is that the phased with-
drawal patterns are unambiguously more attractive for an age 60 retiree, as compared to the 65 
year old. In other words, all expected shortfall risk measures are lower, expected benefit payouts 
to the living retirees are higher, and expected bequests are similar; the portfolios selected are 
slightly lighter in equities.  This is because the mortality drag for the life annuity purchased by a 
younger person, and therefore the benchmark, is substantially lower. By contrast, the higher mor-
tality faced by a 70-year old retiree produces a higher benchmark annuity which translates into 
greater EPVShortfalls, lower expected benefits, and also lower expected bequests. This is despite 
having 10-15% higher equity exposure. This would lead one to conclude that annuitization 
would be relatively more appealing to older retirees, as compared to phased withdrawal pat-
terns.xv 
Table 2 here 
Thus far we have assumed that the annuity benchmark is computed in each case using the 
sex-specific mortality tables relevant to the individual making the purchase. Nevertheless, in 
some contexts, insurers are required to use a unisex table when selling annuities: for example, 
this is the case in the United States if an annuity is purchased using accruals in an employer-
based defined contribution plan (McGill et al., 1996). Likewise in the UK, unisex tables are used 
to price annuities in the Personal Pension arrangements. A unisex mortality table is generated by 
averaging mortality probabilities for men and women at each age.  Naturally, using a unisex ta-
ble slightly boosts the annuity paid to a female retiree and slightly reduces the male’s benefit, as 
  
26
 
compared to using sex-specific tables.  Thus when German mortality tables are used to value 
unisex payouts (as in Appendix A), the payout for a female from a €100 annuity purchase would 
rise by 7% from €5.02 to €5.37, whereas for the male it would decline by 7.7% from €5.82. Us-
ing a unisex table for annuitization would obviously change the benchmark for comparisons with 
phased withdrawal plans. Yet the phased withdrawal plans would still embody the sex-specific 
mortality patterns relevant to the individual decisionmaker. 
Results using the unisex table for the annuity benchmark appear in Table 3. The annuity 
benefit is now equal by construction for men and women, at €5.37 annually for a €100 purchase. 
As a result, the female annuitant would clearly do better than she would under the sex-specific 
table, and the male would do worse.  One surprise is that the results are less clearcut under the 
phased withdrawal patterns. For men, expected shortfalls under all withdrawal patterns are 
lower, expected benefits are lower, and bequests are higher. The pattern is the opposite for 
women: expected shortfalls are higher, expected benefits are higher, and bequests lower. Hence 
when a government requires unisex tables for annuity pricing, a woman who elected a phased 
withdrawal plan would be exposed to greater risk.  It is interesting that this might be an unex-
pected and undesired result for those advocating unisex tables in pension plans. 
Table 3 here 
4.3. Phased Withdrawal Plans with Mandatory Deferred Annuities 
The results above suggest that some retirees might prefer to engage in a mixed strategy: 
that is, to undertake phased withdrawals during the early portion of the retirement period, and 
then to switch to an annuity thereafter.  Furthermore, some researchers have suggested that such 
a mixed strategy would be attractive: it enhances the payout early on, in exchange for relatively 
low risk, and it also adds the insurance feature later in life (Blake et al., 2003; Milevsky, 1998). 
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In addition, some governments have recently required that the elderly annuitize after a phased 
income drawdown period. For example, in the UK, compulsory annuitization is required at age 
75, and German Riester Plans require annuitization at age 85.  
To examine the risks and rewards associated with phased withdrawal followed by an-
nuitization at some later age, we revisit our calculations under each withdrawal rule, assuming 
annuitization is required if the individual is still alive at either age 75 or 85. Two approaches are 
considered. In the first case, which we call the “switching strategy”, a retiree would follow the 
relevant phased withdrawal rule until reaching a mandatory switching age. In all cases, for the 
benchmark, we use the real annuity that the retiree could have purchased at age 65, to compare 
our new results with prior findings.  If, at the switching point, the fund is inadequate to purchase 
this real annuity, the gap represents a shortfall; conversely, if the account holds more than is 
needed to buy the benchmark annuity, this excess can be allocated to increase the bequest or 
used for higher consumption. In the following, we assume that an excess (if any) is used to in-
crease the level of the annuity starting at age 75 or 85, enhancing the EPVBenefits rather than 
EPVBequest measure. 
For the second case, we examine an “immediate purchase deferral strategy”. In this case, 
the retiree purchases an annuity on retirement, with deferred payouts beginning at age 75 (or 85). 
The deferred annuity benefit is set equal to the benchmark that the retiree could have received if 
he initiated annuity payments at age 65. It is worth noting that it is unclear what one might ex-
pect from these switching strategies, in terms of risks and rewards. Some analysts suggest that 
switching may be a preferred strategy, relying on the fact that the mortality drag rises with age, 
so annuities pay out more for a given premium, the older one is when purchasing them 
(Milevsky, 2001). On the other hand, this work focuses only on the probability of a shortfall but 
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does not weight the size of the loss, conditional on the shortfall occurring.  By delaying annuiti-
zation, the retiree can benefit from capital market returns if they are favourable, so benefit pay-
ments can be higher while he lives, or bequests higher if he dies. Yet delaying annuitization also 
exposes him to shortfall risk.  
In Table 4 we indicate findings for a male retiring at age 65, making the decision to 
switch from a phased withdrawal to an annuity at either age 75 (or 85).xvi Comparing results in 
Panel A of Tables 1 and 4, we see that if delayed annuitization is available, this generally in-
creases the EPVBenefits and shrinks the EPVShortfall, both of which are beneficial. The EP-
VBequest falls, indicating that the deferred annuitization strategy is likely to be most attractive to 
those seeking to secure consumption while alive, without completely stripping the heirs of some 
promised funds. In other words, the risk/return profile of the phased withdrawal plan that in-
cludes a delayed annuity is enhanced, as compared to no annuity, at the cost of a smaller bequest 
potential. Also interesting is the fact that switching to an annuity later in life (i.e. at age 85; com-
pare panels A and B in Table 4) raises the equity share of the portfolio slightly, but greatly en-
hances the bond exposure. Also, buying the annuity later obviously promise more bequest poten-
tial, at the cost of higher shortfall.   
Table 4 here 
Table 5 displays results for a 65-year old male purchasing a deferred annuity at the be-
ginning of the retirement period, with annuity payouts beginning at age 75 (or 85) assuming he is 
alive.  In contrast to the mandatory annuitization strategy, we see that the risk and return profile 
depends heavily on the chosen withdrawal rule. In the case of the 1/T rule combined with a de-
ferred annuity payable from age 75, the logical strategy is to consume all remaining wealth using 
the phased withdrawal tactic by age 74, secure in the knowledge that one is protected against 
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longevity risk thereafter.  This pattern provides a benefit stream worth slightly more than the real 
annuity, and it offers low shortfall risk and low expected bequests. This is an important result 
since it indicates the advantage of allowing flexibility until age 75, paired with protected con-
sumption after that age. Similar results hold if the deferred annuity were to begin at age 85, with 
slightly higher benefit and bequest levels at the expense of somewhat higher shortfalls.  By con-
trast, the 1/E(T) rule combined with a deferred annuity at age 75 provides the retiree with rela-
tively low payouts up to age 75, producing a high EPVShortfall, but after that age, benefits flow 
from both the annuity and the phased withdrawal plan which raises EPVBenefits (and higher 
potential bequests). Delaying the annuity payout date to age 85 instead of 75 exposes the retiree 
to much higher shortfall risk, along with higher possible wealth for the heirs.     
Table 5 here 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Though standard economic models imply that most people would highly value the protec-
tion against longevity risk that annuitization offers, many retirees do not purchase annuities with 
their disposable wealth. Certainly if older people have no desire to leave a bequest, annuities 
would seem to be strongly preferred. Yet there is evidence that many older people do intend to 
leave a bequest: for instance, Hurd and Smith (1999) find that more than half of the elderly ex-
pect to leave a bequest worth more than $10,000. As a result, there would seem to be great need 
for models to guide retirees as they examine tradeoffs between consumption versus the possibil-
ity of leaving a bequest. Of course such tradeoffs generally require the retired worker to ex-
change some risk for some return, in which case there is a natural role for phased withdrawal 
programs during the retirement period. 
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Taking risk and value as primitives is appealing for several reasons (Brachinger and We-
ber, 1997). First, from a descriptive perspective, a risk-value model such as ours is likely to be 
useful in explaining retiree preferences by understanding how they trade off expected benefits, 
bequests, and the risk of consumption shortfalls. Second, policymakers and regulators may bene-
fit from evidence on the risk-return patterns of different withdrawal options in tax-favored indi-
vidual retirement plans. Of course financial intermediaries offering retirement products such as 
banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds, can use this information to design and market 
products that have typical benefit, bequest, and risk features. Finally, professional financial plan-
ers may offer better information to their clients when they make retirement investment choices.  
Our approach uses the concept of shortfall-risk, whereby the benefits of a life annuity 
serves as the benchmark, building on research by Milevsky (1998, 2001), Milevsky and Robin-
son (1994, 2000), Milevsky et al. (1997) and Albrecht and Maurer (2002). We extend this re-
search in two directions. First, we use a risk metric which considers both the probability of a 
consumption shortfall as well as the size of the shortfall when it occurs. Second, we focus not 
only on phased withdrawal plans with fixed benefits, but also on variable benefit patterns in con-
junction with a predetermined benefit-to-wealth ratio. We evaluate several alternative designs for 
phased withdrawal strategies, investigating withdrawal rules while allowing for endogenous as-
set allocation patterns, and allowing the worker to make decisions both about when to retire and 
when to switch to an annuity.  Of course, selecting a specific withdrawal pattern requires further 
information on utility weights to trade consumption against bequests, but many retirees and their 
financial counselors may find it difficult to articulate their utility functions in advance. For this 
reason we find that it is useful to explore various explicit risk and return measures for alternative 
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withdrawal plans in a stochastic environment, allowing for randomness in both the time of death 
and investment returns. 
We conclude the following: 
? Discretionary management of accumulated assets with systematic phased withdrawals 
for consumption purposes offers many advantages: flexibility, bequests, and possibly 
higher rates of consumption than can be paid by standard life annuities. But following 
phased withdrawal plans also requires the retiree to devote attention to asset allocation 
and withdrawal rules. 
? Retirees using a phased withdrawal plan who seek to minimize the risk of consuming 
less than the real annuity benchmark will allocate their retirement assets more in fixed in-
come than in equities.  Nonetheless, which specific mix is elected must depend on plan 
design, age, mortality risk, and other factors. 
? A phased withdrawal strategy paying the same benefit as the annuity exposes one to 
the risk of outliving one’s assets while still alive. A phased withdrawal plan using a fixed 
benefit-to-wealth ratio avoids the risk of running out of money, since benefits fluctuate in 
tandem with the pension fund’s value. But a fixed benefit withdrawal rule affords lower 
risk than variable withdrawal rules, if one uses a mortality-weighted shortfall-risk meas-
ure (which includes both shortfall probability and magnitude of loss). 
? Mandatory deferred annuitization with a fixed withdrawal rule can enhance expected 
payouts and cut expected shortfall risk but at the cost of reduced expected bequests, as 
compared to no annuity. For a variable withdrawal plan, a simple deferred annuitization 
may not reduce risk: rather, it requires optimization of the benefit to wealth ratio.  
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? As a standalone strategy, the 1/E(T) phased withdrawal rule is appealing since it of-
fers relatively low expected shortfall risk, good expected payouts for the retiree during 
his life, and some bequest potential for his heirs. But if mandatory annuities are combined 
with this phased withdrawal plan, the 1/E(T) rule is less attractive. 
? The optimized 1/T rule and the fixed benefit rule both have appealing risk character-
istics, particularly when combined with a mandatory deferred annuity.  
? Unisex mortality tables have been advocated by some who believe they are “fairer” to 
women in annuity calculations. However, we show that if phased withdrawal plans are 
available as an alternative, unsex tables used for annuity pricing can make women’s ex-
pected shortfalls higher, expected benefits higher, and bequests lower under a phased 
withdrawal program, as compared to annuitization.  
 
These findings have general relevance for national retirement policy. For example, the 
1/E(T) rule has been adopted by the US tax authority for the “default” withdrawal pattern in pri-
vate defined contribution accounts (401k’s), and our results show that this is a relatively appeal-
ing standard in the US context where annuitization is not mandatory. We also find that mandat-
ing annuitization after a phased withdrawal period can be quite appealing in terms of risk, so it is 
interesting that this approach has recently been implemented in both the UK and Germany.  
Some degree of mandated annuitization has also proposed for the US by the recent Commission 
to Strengthen Social Security in the US context (Cogan and Mitchell, 2003). Our results also 
imply that a government mandate requiring that unisex tables be adopted for annuity pricing (as 
in the UK) exposes women who elected a phased withdrawal plan to greater risk.  Finally, our 
results have implications for the asset mix retirees will optimally want to hold: later annuitization 
(say, at age 85) would imply a larger fraction of the financial assets would be held in bonds. 
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Figure 1: Mean Benefit of Withdrawal Plan Conditional on Survival 
(50% Equities / 50% Bonds): Life Annuity Benchmark
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Figure 2: Shortfall Probability of Withdrawal Plan Conditional on Survival 
(50% Equities / 50% Bonds): Life Annuity Benchmark
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Figure 3: Mean Excess Loss of Withdrawal Plan Conditional on Survival 
(50% Equities / 50% Bonds): Life Annuity Benchmark
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Figure 4: Expected Shortfall of Withdrawal Plan Conditional on Survival 
(50% Equities / 50% Bonds): Life Annuity Benchmark
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 5: Mean Bequest of Withdrawal Plan Conditional on Death 
(50% Equities / 50% Bonds) as % of Initial Capital
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 1.  Results for Risk-Minimizing Phased Withdrawal Strategies  
Using Sex-specific Mortality Tables for Annuity Pricing, Allowing Optimized Asset Allocation: 
Male and Female Retirees 
 
A. Results for Male (Retirement Age 65): Benchmark Real Life Annuity €5.82 p.a./ €100 
Investment Weights (in %) Strategy EPV 
Shortfall 
EPV 
Benefits 
EPV 
Bequest Equity Bonds Cash 
1. Real Annuity €5.82 0 97.291 0    
2. Fixed Benefit = €5.82 3.579 93.408 53.191 20 80 0 
3. Fixed Pct. = 5.82% 12.582 92.528 66.055 30 70 0 
4. Fixed Pct. Opt ω = 7.0% 11.303 98.450 52.929 30 70 0 
5. 1/T Rule Age 110 34.953 82.680 134.410 50 50 0 
6. 1/T Rule Opt. Age 87 15.155 104.439 32.997 15 75 10 
7. 1/E(T) Rule 8.271 103.075 39.801 20 80 0 
B. Results for Female (Retirement Age 65): Benchmark Real Life Annuity €5.02 p.a./ €100 
8. Real Annuity €5.02 0 97.291 0    
9. Fixed Benefit = €5.02 1.507 95.652 54.188 15 65 20 
10. Fixed Pct. = 5.02% 9.246 98.732 70.474 25 75 0 
11. Fixed Pct. Opt ω= 6.1% 7.889 105.382 58.535 25 75 0 
12. 1/T Rule Age 110 26.554 97.951 122.997 40 60 0 
13. 1/T Rule Opt. Age 91 12.279 116.192 32.072 15 75 10 
14. 1/E(T) Rule 5.688 113.469 35.482 15 85 0 
Notes:  
EPV Shortfall: expected present value of future benefit payments below the life annuity (shortfall)  
EPV Bequest: expected present value of future bequest payments 
EPV Payments: expected present value of future benefit payments 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2.  Results for Risk-Minimizing Phased Withdrawal Strategies  
Using Sex-specific Mortality Tables for Annuity Pricing, Allowing Optimized Asset Allocation: 
Male Retirees Only 
A. Results for Male (Retirement Age 60): Benchmark Real Life Annuity €4.95 p.a/€100 
Investment Weights (in %) Strategy EPV 
Shortfall 
EPV 
Benefits 
EPV 
Bequest Equity Bonds Cash 
Real Annuity €4.95 0 97.291 0    
Fixed Benefit = €4.95 1.734 95.444 57.367 15 70 15 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω=6.0% 7.826 105.931 55.863 25 75 0 
1/T Rule Opt Age 88  13.244 116.233 34.711 15 80 5 
1/E(T) Rule 6.051 112.150 38.541 15 85 0 
B. Results for Male (Retirement Age 70): Benchmark Real Life Annuity €7.03 p.a./ €100 
Real Annuity €7.03 0 97.291 0    
Fixed Benefit = €7.03 6.628 90.086 45.104 25 75 0 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω=8.5% 15.450 92.839 50.585 40 60 0 
1/T Rule Opt. Age 87 17.601 91.870 30.274 10 60 30 
1/E(T) Rule 11.913 93.692 41.185 25 75 0 
Note: See Table 1. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3.  Results for Risk-Minimizing Phased Withdrawal Strategies  
Using Unisex Mortality Tables for Annuity Pricing, Allowing Optimized Asset Allocation: Male 
and Female Retirees 
A. Results for Male (Retirement Age 65): Benchmark Real Life Annuity €5.37 p.a./ €100 
Investment Weights (in %) Strategy EPV 
Shortfall 
EPV 
Benefits 
EPV 
Bequest Equity Bonds Cash 
Real Annuity €5.37 0 89.871 0    
Fixed Benefit €5.37 1.946 87.918 56.332 15 80 5 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω=6.6% 8.130 94.569 54.878 25 75 0 
1/T Rule Opt. Age 88 11.588 98.398 34.376 10 65 25 
1/E(T) Rule 5.140 100.679 38.650 15 85 0 
B. Results for Female (Retirement Age 65): Benchmark Life Annuity €5.37 p.a./ €100  
Real Annuity €5.37 0 104.206 0    
Fixed Benefit €5.37 2.776 100.986 51.264 15 85 0 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω=6.4% 10.716 109.501 53.819 30 70 0 
1/T Rule Opt Age 91 15.531 118.108 32.643 15 85 0 
1/E(T) Rule 8.567 116.704 36.822 20 80 0 
Note: See Table 1. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4.  Results for Risk-Minimizing Phased Withdrawal Strategies Allowing Switching to 
Life Annuities  
Using Sex-specific Tables for Annuity Pricing, Allowing Optimized Asset Allocation and With-
drawal Fraction: Male Retirees Only 
 
A. Results for Male (Retirement Age 65 Switching Age 75): Benchmark Real Life Annu-
ity €5.82 p.a./ €100  
Investment Weights (in %) Strategy EPV 
Shortfall 
EPV 
Benefits 
EPV 
Bequest Equity Bonds Cash 
Real Annuity €5.82 0 97.291 0    
Fixed Benefit until 75 0.934 100.321 12.590 5 25 70 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω=6.8% 2.820 104.098 12.595 10 45 45 
1/T Rule Opt Age 83 2.893 103.894 12.814 10 40 50 
1/E(T) Rule 3.210 101.109 13.090 5 35 60 
B. Results for Male (Retirement Age 65 Switching Age 85): Benchmark Life Annuity 
€5.82 p.a./ €100  
Real Annuity €5.82 0 97.291 0    
Fixed Benefit until 85 2.819 103.425 33.575 15 80 5 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω=7.4% 7.400 108.844 32.235 25 75 0 
1/T Rule Opt Age 88 9.521 108.265 35.141 20 80 0 
1/E(T) Rule 5.406 104.143 31.194 15 75 10 
Note: See Table 1. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5.  Results for Risk Minimizing Phased Withdrawal Strategies with Immediate Pur-
chase of Mandatory Deferred Life Annuities  
Using Sex-specific Tables for Annuity Pricing, Allowing Optimized Asset Allocation and With-
drawal Fraction, Male Retirees Only 
 
Results for Male (Retirement Age 65 annuity deferred up to Age 75):  
Benchmark Real Life Annuity €5.82 p.a./ €100  
Investment Weights (in %) Strategy EPV- 
Shortfall 
EPV- 
Benefits 
EPV- 
Bequest Equity Bonds Cash 
Real Annuity €5.82 0 97.291 0    
Fixed Benefit until 75 0.55 97.426 3.606 5 15 80 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω=15.3% 9.267 106.984 8.457 50 50 0 
1/T-Rule Opt Age 74 1.242 99.810 3.590 5 20 75 
1/E(T) Rule 21.773 121.689 31.474 85 15 0 
Results for Male (Retirement Age 65 annuity deferred up to Age 85):  
Benchmark Life Annuity €5.82 p.a./ €100  
Real Annuity €5.82 0 97.291 0    
Fixed Benefit until 85 1.850 101.352 20.551 10 55 35 
Fixed  Pct. Opt ω= 8.7% 11.008 104.750 34.698 35 65 0 
1/T-Rule Opt Age 84 7.074 106.822 21.387 15 85 5 
1/E(T) Rule 10.624 102.280 34.094 20 80 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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 Appendix A: Determining Annuity Benefits 
 
Using the actuarial principle of equivalence, we estimate the gross single premium of the annuity 
by calculating the present value of expected benefits paid to the annuitant including provider 
expense loadings (i.e. commissions and administration fees). Formally, the annuity benefits paid 
in advance of each year until death are given according to the following equation 
 .
)R(1p)1(
x-l
0t
t-
fxt
0
∑
=
+⋅+
=
λ
V
B  (A1) 
Here Rf denotes the (deterministic) interest rate used by the insurance company to discount future 
expected cash flows, tpx the conditional probability that a man aged x will attain age x+t with 
respect to a mortality table (with maximum age l), and 1+λ is the expense loading factor. To cal-
culate the annuity benefits for females, the tpx in equation (A1) must be substituted with the sex 
specific survival probabilities tpy for females. In the case when a unisex table is used, the sur-
vival probabilities are calculated using a specific mortality table for females. 
 
Explicit assumptions must be made about mortality risk, the annuitant’s age, the interest rate 
used by the insurance company to discount expected benefit payments, and the cost structure of 
the insurance company. Following Albrecht and Maurer (2002), we take into consideration the 
basic annuitant mortality table DAV 1994 R for the specification of the demographic parameters. 
This table is provided by the German Society of Actuaries and is widely used in the German an-
nuities market. The table offers sex-specific mortality rates qx (qy) for male and female. From 
these sex specific mortality rates we construct the mortality rates of a unisex table as a weighted 
average of qx and qy. The interest rate used to discount expected annuity payments is set to an 
annual real 1.5%, consistent with the current yield of Euro-based inflation-linked bonds. Regard-
ing the cost-structure of the insurance company, it is assumed that the total expense loading rela-
tive to the pure actuarial premium is 2.785%, i.e. λ = 1.02785.  
 
Given these assumptions, table A1 shows the yearly benefits (adjusted for inflation and before 
personal income taxes) a retiree with age 60, 65 and 70 would receive per 100 EUR of premium. 
 
Table A1.  Immediate Annual Life-long Real Annuity Benefits per EUR 100 Single Pre-
mium: Total Expense Loadings 2.785%; Discount Factor 1.5%; DAV R 94 Mortality Ta-
bles 
 
Mortality Table Male Female Unisex 
Retirement Age Life Annuity € p.a. 
60 4.9480 4.3215 4.6063 
65 5.8177 5.0174 5.3738 
70 7.0330 5.9900 6.4421 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix B: Determining Expected Benefits, Expected Bequest and the Risk of a Con-
sumption Shortfall for Phased Withdrawal Plans with given Benefit-to-Wealth Ratios 
 
Let ωt = Bt/Vt (t = 0, 1, ..,) be a predetermined sequence of benefit-to-wealth ratios 0 ≤ ωt ≤ 1, 
and define )1(
0
i
t
i
tc ωω ∏
=
−= . The retirement accounts assets (adjusted for inflation) used to fund 
the variable pension benefits Bt are assumed to follow a geometric random walk with drift. This 
implies that the real log returns It over the year are serially independent and identically normal 
distributed with given mean µ and volatility σ. Given an initial endowment V0 at the beginning of 
the retirement phase, the market value of the retiree’s account at the beginning of year t (t = 1, 2, 
…) just before the withdrawal Bt for that year is made: 
 ( ) 

=−= ∑
=
−−−
t
i
tttttt IVcIVV
1
0111 expexp)1( ωω . (B1) 
Vt is distributed log-normally, i.e. ln(Vt) ~ N(mt, v²t) follows a normal-distribution with mean mt 
= ln[cωt-1 V0] + tµ and variance ².2 σtvt = Consequently, the benefit payments Bt at the beginning 
of each period: 
 

== ∑
=
−
t
i
tttttt IVcVB
1
01 expωωω  (B2) 
are also log-normally distributed, i.e. ln(Bt) ~ N(nt, v²t) with parameters nt = ln[ωt cωt-1 V0] + tµ. 
With these formulas in hand, and additional assumptions about the expected return µ and volatil-
ity σ of the retirement accounts assets, it is possible to compute for the variable phased with-
drawal rules - i.e. fixed fraction, 1/T and 1/E(T) - various risk and return measures of future 
benefits if the retiree is alive as well as the possible bequest in the case he dies. 
 
The expected benefit payments E[Bt] in each period t = 0, 1, … are given by: 
 )
2
1exp()exp(]E[ 201
21
2 σµωω ttVcvnB ttttt +=+= −  (B3) 
and the expected bequest if the retiree dies in period t = 1, 2, … according to: 
 )
2
1exp()exp(]E[ 20
21
2 σµω ttVcvmV tttt +=+=  (B4) 
The shortfall probability that the benefits from a variable withdrawal plan is lower than a target 
annuity z can be calculated as: 
 ( )tt qB Φ=)SP(  (B5) 
where Φ  is the cumulative density function of the Standard Normal Distribution at the point 
./)( tmzq tt σ−=  Using the results given in Winkler et al., (1972) the shortfall expectation is: 
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 )(]E[)()SE( 2 tqBqzB tttt ⋅−Φ⋅−Φ⋅= σ . (B6) 
Finally, combining (B5) and (B6) the Mean Excess Loss can be computed as: 
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Appendix C:  Summary Statistics for Real Annual Log-Returns (before tax) on Stocks and 
Bonds in the German Capital Market 1967-2002 
 
Correlations Asset Class Mean return 
(% p.a) 
Volatility 
(% p.a.) Stocks Bonds Cash 
Stocks 5.53 25.36 1   
Bonds 3.98 5.21 0.235 1  
Cash 2.84 1.69 -0.174 0.326 1 
Source: Authors’ calculations.. 
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Endnotes 
 
i See Brugiavini (1993) for a theoretical model in which the health status of the retiree is stochas-
tic. 
ii Perhaps the most widely used risk-return model in the area of finance is the classic mean-
variance portfolio analysis elaborated by Markowitz (1952), which is, inter alia, consistent with 
a quadratic utility function (see Campbell and Viceira, 2002, p. 24). A general analysis of condi-
tions regarding the compatibility of multiparameter trade-off models of choice with the expected 
utility model is given in Schneeweiß (1967). 
iiiSee for instance Milevsky et al. (1997), Milevsky and Robinson (2000), Milevsky (1998, 2001), 
Ameriks et al. (2001), Pye (2000, 2001) and Albrecht and Maurer (2002).  
iv This is accurate for the German context; for more on annuity tax treatment in the US see 
Brown et al. (2001). 
v Feldstein et al. (2001) and Ibbotson (2003) assume that retirees hold their non-annuitized assets 
in a 60% stock, 40% bond portfolio. Here, for illustrative purposes, we use a more conservative 
50-50 split, consistent with the position recommended by the President’s Commission to 
Strengthen Social Security (see Cogan and Mitchell (2003)). Some financial advisers propose 
that investors hold equities equal to 100 minus their age; see Canner et al. (1997) or Vora and 
McGinnes (2000). The number 100 could (probably) be justified with the maximum age used in 
most population mortality tables but we note that annuitant mortality tables generally have a 
maximum age of 10-15 years higher.  
vi Feldstein et al. (2001) p. 60 use a similar procedure to account for administration costs. 
vii This assumption is widely used in strategic asset allocation (e.g. Feldstein et al. (2001) or 
Campbell and Viceira (2002)) and can be justified by a Taylor approximation of the nonlinear 
function relating log-individual-asset returns to log portfolio returns. For full details see Camp-
bell and Viceira (2002), p. 28-29 and Campbell et al. (2001). 
viii Milevsky and Robinson (2000) have developed an analytical approximation method based on 
moment-matching techniques and the reciprocal gamma distribution and therefore can avoid 
Monte Carlo-simulation.  
ix The concept of shortfall risk was introduced in the area of finance by Roy (1952) and Kataoka 
(1963), and it was expanded and theoretically justified by Bawa (1975) and Fishburn (1977, 
1982, 1984). It was widely applied to investment asset allocation by Leibowitz et al. (1996) and 
used by Leibowitz and Krasker (1988) and Maurer and Schlag (2003) among others to judge the 
long term risk of stocks and bonds. In addition Libby and Fishburn (1977); Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979); Laughhuun et al. (1980) and March and Shapira (1987) show that in empirical busi-
ness decision-making, many individuals judge the risk of an alternative relative to a reference 
point. 
x This results from the lognormal distribution of future benefits which become increasingly 
skewed to the right, the longer the retiree remains alive. Note that the expected level return (i.e. 
exp(0.0552 + 0.5*0.1378²) - 1 = 6.66%) of the retirement account assets is greater than the with-
drawal fraction (i.e. 5.82%), but the median level return (i.e. exp(0.0552) - 1 = 5.68%) is slightly 
below the withdrawal fraction, so the shortfall probability rises with age. 
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xi The MEL is closely connected with the Tail Conditional Expectation (TCE), which is given by 
TCE = E(RR < z) = z–MEL. The TCE has some favourable features, e.g. it is (in contrast to the 
shortfall probability) a coherent risk measure with respect to the axioms developed by Artzner et 
al. (1999). 
xii In addition, the SE is related to the price of a (derivative) financial contract which allows the 
annuitant to transfer the downside risk of a phased withdrawal plan into the capital market. For 
example, if the retiree buys a put option paying Pt = max(z–Bt, 0) at time t, then he is completely 
hedged against the risk that the benefit from the withdrawal plan is lower than the payment from 
the benchmark annuity z. Note that the future benefits are directly related to the market value of 
the retirement accounts assets Vt. Using standard arguments from option pricing theory, the price 
of such a (European) put option is given by p0 = EQ[max(z–Bt, 0)]/exp(Rf··t), where EQ denotes 
the expectation operator with respect to the risk adjusted (“martingale”) probabilities and Rf is 
the risk free interest rate. 
xiii Note, if SE(Bt)/(1+Rf)t is calculated with respect to the corresponding risk adjusted (“martin-
gale”) probabilities (consistent with an arbitrage free capital market) of the underlying asset 
process, it is consistent with the price of an European put option which pays the difference if a 
shortfall happens in year t after retirement. Then the EPVShortfall is the value of a portfolio con-
sisting of (European) put options weighted by survival probabilities tpx. 
xiv For example, assume that the individual trades off expected benefit payments versus the ex-
pected shortfall vis a vis the benchmark annuity z, i.e. Φ(Bt)=E(Bt)–kE[max(z–Bt, 0)] with risk 
aversion parameter k>0 (and ignoring bequests).  This risk value model is consistent with a util-
ity function suggested by Fishburn (1977) of the form u(x)=x if x≥z resp. u(x)=x–k(z-x) if x<z. As 
Bawa (1975, 1978) has shown, the mean/SE-optimization model studied here corresponds with 
the concept of second order stochastic dominance. To allow tradeoffs between EPVBenefit and 
EPVShortfall, we make the usual assumption that the individual’s objective function is given by 
a time separable utility function of the Fishburn type, and that the individual’s time preference is 
equal to the risk-free real interest rate. See also Brachinger and Weber (1997) for risk as a primi-
tive.  
xv Similar conclusions apply to women, though the differences by retirement age are less pro-
nounced; results are available on request. 
xvi Results for women are available on request. 
